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Book Review

Deconstructing Deconstruction
The Rhetoric of Church and State
by Frederick Mark Gedicks
Duke University Press (1995)
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Rhetoric of Church and State,1 Frederick Mark Gedicks attempts to weave a common thread through what has
become, by most accounts, a “tangled web”2 of Supreme Court
religion clause jurisprudence. Professor Gedicks states that his
book “is generally a work of description.”3 This characterization, however, is misleadingly modest; the book goes far beyond
merely cataloguing the frustratingly inconsistent and, at times,
inequitable parade of religion clause cases the Court has decided in recent years.
Although Professor Gedicks stops short of explicitly offering
normative solutions to this problem of inconsistency,4 he focuses intensely on the theoretical underpinnings of the Court’s
approach to the interaction between religion and the state.
This focus leads Gedicks to the hypothesis that the confusion in
this area of law is not simply the result of an ad hoc approach
to religious liberty issues. Rather, it stems from a shift by the
1. FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE (1995).
2. Id. at 4; see also, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 693 (1997) (describing the Court’s religion clause jurisprudence as “a mess”); Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1989) (describing the
Court’s religion clause jurisprudence as “riven by contradictions and bogged down in
slogans and metaphors”).
3. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 7.
4. In fact, Professor Gedicks affirmatively states in his introduction, “My purpose here is not to articulate and defend a particular normative vision of church-state
relations.” Id. However, the subtext of the book seems to advocate a regime in which
religion is allowed a more prominent role in public discourse than it is under the
Court’s current understanding. See infra Part III.
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Court away from a “religiously informed communitarian discourse,”5 in which religion, as the primary source of societal
values, is welcome in public debate,6 toward a “secular, neutral,
individualist discourse,”7 in which religion is viewed with suspicion and given no legitimate place in the public decisionmaking process.8 Professor Gedicks concludes that this secular
individualist discourse, which has been influenced by twentieth
century notions of relativism, naturalistic science, and legal realism,9 has utterly failed to provide a satisfactory system of interaction between church and state and, therefore, “should be
abandoned.”10
In reaching this conclusion, Professor Gedicks identifies two
flaws inherent in the secular individualist discourse. First, he
shows that while secular individualism justifies its exclusion of
religion from public debate on the distinctly postmodern
grounds that religion is “subjective,”11 it simultaneously fails to
recognize its own subjectivity. Professor Gedicks illustrates
this theoretical flaw through a discussion of the Court’s inability, despite its use of the rhetoric of objectivity, to convincingly
ascribe “inherent meaning” to the neutrality principle in estab-

5. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 4.
6. See id. at 11; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Improbability of Religion
Clause Theory, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233, 1237 (1997) (noting that “[r]eligious
communitarianism presumes a society in which church and state are institutionally
but not politically or culturally separated”). Professor Gedicks argues that something
like this religious communitarian discourse dominated American politics and law
through the nineteenth century, resulting in the “de facto establishment” of Protestant
Christianity as the state religion. See GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 16-17 (citing MARK DE
WOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 11-15 (1965)).
7. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 4. Professor Gedicks makes clear that these competing discourses should not be taken too literally as “an attempted reconstruction of
the past as it was experienced by those who lived it.” Id. at 24. Instead, they are “ideological constructions for a contemporary purpose—to reorganize and understand more
deeply the religion clause jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.” Id. at 23-24. The value
of this dichotomy, he says, “lies not in [its] historical, but in [its] rhetorical plausibility.” Id. at 24.
8. See id. at 12 (“[P]ublic life is the realm of the objective, secular discourse protected from the irrationality and subjectivity of faith.”). Professor Gedicks notes elsewhere that, on a societal scale, this shift began in earnest early in the twentieth century. See id. at 18. Not until Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 855 (1947), did
the Court “abandon[] religious communitarianism as a normative guide to church-state
relations, in favor of secular individualism.” Gedicks, supra note 6, at 1241.
9. See GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 18.
10. Id. at 125.
11. Id. at 30.
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lishment clause cases.12 Second, Professor Gedicks shows that
secular individualism will not countenance some policy results
that both the Court and the American people desire;13 the
Court’s “deep commitment”14 to the rhetoric of secular individualism therefore forces it to manufacture implausible secular justifications for undeniably religion-friendly outcomes.15 As
Professor Gedicks puts it, the Court often finds itself “defend[ing] results that are possible only within religious communitarian discourse with arguments that can be made only
with secular individualist discourse.”16 Gedicks demonstrates
this practical flaw by examining the contradictory results of
seemingly similar cases dealing with issues such as parochial
schools, religious colleges, religious exemptions from generally
applicable legislation, and religious tax exemptions.17
Both flaws evidence a certain intellectual dishonesty that
has generated “ridicule by commentators, and lack of popular
support” on both sides of the debate.18 Although an analysis of
each flaw, and its potential relationship with the other, would
be enlightening, the remainder of this Book Review will focus
on Professor Gedicks’s theoretical treatment of the first flaw:
the overconfidence of the secular individualist discourse in its
own ability to provide absolute meaning in public debate. Part
II will describe in greater detail Professor Gedicks’s analysis,
giving particular attention to his attempt to deconstruct the
subjective/objective dichotomy upon which secular individualist
discourse relies. Part III will begin by suggesting that an acceptance of the subtext of Professor Gedicks’s arguments inevi-

12. See id. at 25-43.
13. The depiction by a state actor of religious holiday symbols, such as nativity
scenes, Christmas trees, and Hanukah menorahs, provides the clearest example. See
id. at 76-80.
14. Id. at 76.
15. See id. at 45.
16. Id. at 63. For example, in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the depiction of the nativity of Jesus as part of a citysponsored Christmas display. According to secular individualist discourse, which does
not contemplate the overt sponsorship by the state of any religious symbol, the Court
could not simply recognize the nativity scene as an expression of religious belief. The
Court avoided the dilemma by concluding that the nativity scene had no real religious
significance; it was instead a secular recognition of the origin of the Christmas holiday,
intended to foster a friendly community spirit. See id. at 680; see also GEDICKS, supra
note 1, at 76-78. As Professor Gedicks notes, such a distinction is “ludicrous.” Id. at 76.
17. See GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 44-116.
18. Id. at 3.
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tably leads to a return to a religion clause jurisprudence in
which religion is allowed a more prominent role in public debate.19 Part III will then present the possibility that such a discourse may exhibit a theoretical flaw similar to that which Gedicks identifies in the secular individualist discourse, and will
suggest that, if this is the case, all discussion of religion clause
theory in terms of these competing discourses becomes useless.
Finally, Part III will suggest that there may indeed be a characteristic of religion-based discourse that recommends it as
theoretically superior to the secular individualist discourse. Although this conclusion will not completely resolve the subjective/objective dichotomy from a postmodern viewpoint, it demonstrates that a religion-based discourse avoids the internal
inconsistency inherent in the secular-based discourse and,
therefore, is to be theoretically preferred.
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE SECULAR INDIVIDUALIST DISCOURSE
Professor Gedicks begins his discussion of the secular individualist discourse’s theoretical flaw by noting that
“[c]ontemporary philosophers have largely abandoned the classical account of truth and knowledge under the pressure of
postmodern arguments that human beings cannot experience
the world without simultaneously altering it.”20 As a result,
“[f]acts are not taken to have any essential characteristics or
meaning;”21 instead, facts only “mean” something by reference
to the theory or structure that orders them.22 Observers operating from different theoretical perspectives thus “see (and fail to
see) certain aspects of the world that seem absent (or present)
in the experience” of other observers.23 Indeed, for proponents
of such postmodern models, “objectivity is impossible.”24
The secular individualist discourse embraces this postmodern model of truth and uses it to discredit religion as a basis for
decision-making in the public sphere.25 As Professor Gedicks

19. This is despite his claims to the contrary. See supra note 4.
20. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 9.
21. Id.
22. See id. For a good basic exposition of this postmodern approach to truth in
the context of literary criticism, see David L. Cowles, Poststructuralism, in THE
CRITICAL EXPERIENCE 102 (David L. Cowles ed., 1992).
23. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 26-27.
24. Cowles, supra note 22, at 109.
25. Indeed, as has been mentioned, the discourse displays affinities for other
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notes, secular individualism proceeds on the assumption that
“no single set of values can be objectively shown to be better
than any other set.”26 Therefore, the discourse emphasizes
“preservation of individual choice through value-neutral procedures, so that individuals remain free to act upon the truths
they discover in the exercise of their own reason.”27 Reason will
presumably lead each individual to different value choices;
thus the secular individualist discourse avoids “impos[ing] a set
of strong values on society.”28
According to the secular individualist discourse, only actions that can be “justified empirically or rationally, by reference to the observable and explainable phenomena of the exterior world” may be properly employed in public life.29 In
contrast, the religious communitarian discourse sees nothing
wrong with employing privately held religious beliefs in public
decision-making; in fact, religion-based values lie “at the heart
of community preservation.”30 However, because the secular individualist discourse views these values as inherently subjective and unverifiable by any rational method, their consideration in politics and law is per se improper. The secular
individualist discourse thus “treat[s] . . . religious belief . . . as a
subjective value preference restricted to private life.”31
The postmodern model of truth upon which the secular individualist discourse is founded, however, makes this marginalization of religion problematic.32 While adherents to the
postmodern model recognize that facts have only the subjective
meaning assigned to them by the theory that orders them, they
are still called upon to evaluate which theories give the best
“account[] of the facts they purport to explain.”33 This qualita-

relativist theories that have developed during the twentieth century. See supra note 9
and accompanying text.
26. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 30.
27. Id. at 13.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 29. In another formulation of this principle, Professor Gedicks describes secular individualist discourse as holding that “only if a belief is confirmed by
widely shared human experience, scientific investigation, or reasoning from premises
that can be verified by such experience or investigation does it qualify as knowledge
upon which government legitimately can act.” Id. at 31.
30. Id. at 13.
31. Id. at 32.
32. Professor Gedicks refers to this difficulty as an “antimony.” Id. at 9.
33. Id.
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tive evaluation necessarily proceeds “on the basis of some pretheoretical meaning these facts are assumed to possess.”34 In
effect, a theory that embraces the postmodern idea that meaning only occurs by reference to the ordering system risks becoming internally inconsistent. By its own admission, it is impossible for observers operating from a different theoretical
perspective to appreciate the truth of the “facts” within the system. At the same time, by definition, the acknowledgment of
the subjectivity of truth should preclude those operating within
the system from having any absolute faith in the “meaning” the
system has created.
By self-confidently pointing to religion’s lack of objectivity
as the basis for its disqualification from public debate, the secular individualist discourse partakes of this internal inconsistency. The secular individualist discourse confines “subjective”
religion to the private sphere, while reserving a place in the
public sphere for secular knowledge; therefore, it tacitly
argues, contrary to its postmodern assumption, that secular
knowledge has inherent, objective meaning. Said another way,
the secular individualist discourse denies that the boundary
between “moral” and “immoral” can be absolutely defined by religion, but then assumes that its own definition of the “boundary between the private world of subjective preference and the
public world of objective fact is natural, fixed and inevitable.”35
As Gedicks suggests, “[w]ithout a postulate of inherent meaning,”36 such a conclusion should be suspect.
Professor Gedicks illustrates this internal inconsistency by
analyzing the Supreme Court’s unsatisfying Establishment
Clause policy of “government neutrality” toward religion. The
policy mandates that, to avoid favoring one subjective value
system over another, government actors must make decisions
based on objective secular knowledge alone.37 Within the secular individualist discourse, which considers religion subjective,
this approach is plausibly viewed as “neutral.” However, those
operating from within a religion-based discourse view such a
policy, with equal plausibility, as “bald . . . religious persecu-

34. Id.
35. Id. at 32.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 30 (“The state . . . stay[s] aloof from the pursuit of values in private
life and act[s] only on the basis of objective facts . . . .”).
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tion,”38 an improper “privileging of secular knowledge”39 over
religious belief. The Court’s policy is thus inherently “neutral”
only if religion is inherently subjective and if those who subscribe to religious beliefs are inherently mistaken.40 Given the
secular individualist distaste for concepts of inherent meaning,
the circularity of such an argument is obvious.
Thus, not only does the secular individualist discourse lack
objectivity from the perspective of outside observers, its inconsistent utilization of postmodern theory to critique religious
communitarian discourse further damages its theoretical
credibility. While some postmodern theorists deal with this internal inconsistency problem by acknowledging and, indeed,
reveling in it,41 the secular individualist discourse takes itself
seriously, seemingly oblivious to its own flaw. In so doing, the
discourse demonstrates not only inconsistency but a troubling
intellectual dishonesty as well.
III. A RETURN TO A RELIGION-BASED DISCOURSE?
As has been mentioned, Professor Gedicks’s critique of the
secular individualist discourse does not extend to an overt recommendation that the Supreme Court return to the “ ‘de facto
Protestant establishment’ ”42 of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Indeed, Professor Gedicks notes that such a return is
unlikely, at least in the immediate future, given the confused
state of current Supreme Court precedent.43 More fundamen38. Id. at 43.
39. Id. at 32.
40. See id. at 43 (“The privatization of religion by secular individualist discourse
is an act of power that can plausibly be defended as religiously neutral only if religion
is presented as a ‘naturally’ private activity, excluded from public life like all value
preferences.”).
41. Professor David Cowles’s analysis of the theories of Jacques Derrida, a pioneer of postmodern literary criticism, demonstrates this approach:
This kind of paradox occurs everywhere—including in Derrida’s own work, as
he is the first to recognize . . . with wry humor. Derrida himself emphasizes
the impossibility of explaining his theories using traditional systems of logic
and exposition—as I have of necessity tried to do here. Like Derrida, I can
only explain deconstruction using the very languages and systems it subverts. Though we recognize its paradoxes and inconsistencies, we have no
other language to work with.
Cowles, supra note 22, at 114. For Derrida, the internal inconsistency inherent in
postmodern criticism was best described as “play.” Id. at 111.
42. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 16 (citing HOWE, supra note 6, at 11-15).
43. See id. at 122 (“Religion clause jurisprudence would need radical surgery before religious communitarian discourse could give an account of it that is any more co-
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tally, he worries that “at least some [consequences of a return
to religious communitarianism] are undesirable.”44 In the end,
Gedicks specifically rejects the religious communitarian approach as he has defined it: “Religious communitarian discourse is not a viable alternative to secular individualism.”45
Despite this disclaimer, the subtext of Professor Gedicks’s
arguments seems to suggest a predilection for a return to some
form of religion-sensitive public discourse. For example, Gedicks uses language in his description of the secular individualist discourse that subtly betrays his bias. He describes the
secularist argument that religion is unfit for public discourse
as the “marginaliz[ation] of religious belief,”46 and refers to the
modern prevalence of secularism over religion as an indefensible “act of power”47 and as “violence.”48 More directly, Gedicks
notes that “[a]t present, secular individualism and religious
communitarianism are the only two imaginable alternatives.
Virtually every proposal of theoretical or doctrinal reform in religion clause jurisprudence modulates between” these two discourses.49 If this is true, any move away from secular individualist discourse necessarily becomes a move toward religious
communitarian discourse. Gedicks may indeed disagree with a
return to a “de facto establishment;” however, given the alternatives he presents, his criticism of the secular individualist
discourse seems at least to suggest a preference for an approach in which religious values are not completely banished
from the public square.50
herent than that of secular individualism.”).
44. Id. at 123.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 32.
47. Id. at 43.
48. Id. at 4.
49. Id. at 123.
50. But see id. at 123 (arguing that, because the discourses are “antithetical” to
each other, “efforts to mediate a compromise position between the two are doomed”); id.
at 124 (“Even granting the dubious assumption that a coherent (if unholy) combination
of [the discourses] is rhetorically possible, championing this amalgamated discourse is
likely to have little practical effect.”).
Although a “combination” of religious communitarianism and secular individualism may indeed be theoretically impossible, another option may be to resort to a religion-based discourse that defines “religious values” on a level of greater generality than
did the discourse which resulted in the de facto Protestant establishment. Such a discourse would need to be crafted to allow consideration of traditional religious morality
in Establishment Clause cases, while still protecting acts of religious devotion under
the Free Exercise Clause by members of minority religious groups. Admittedly, such a
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A return to a religion-based discourse51 would bring with it
some of the problems of subjectivity that Professor Gedicks
identifies in his critique of the secular individualist discourse.
Just as secular individualism looks subjective to outside observers, religious belief is subjective from a secular point of
view. If this subjectivity problem alone disqualifies all theories
from public debate, further theoretical discussion of religious
clause jurisprudence would be meaningless—according to the
postmodern model of truth, no discourse can escape this external subjectivity.52 It is, of course, improbable that theorists will
stop talking about theory in the religion clause debate;53 what
remains is to determine which theory, despite its postmodern
flaws, supplies the best “account[] of the facts [it] purport[s] to
explain.”54
On a purely theoretical level, religion-based discourse
seems to possess a quality that recommends it as superior to
secular individualist discourse. By disqualifying religion from
public debate on the grounds that the “facts” it contributes are
subjective, secular individualism subscribes to the postmodern
model, which describes all meaning as bound to the history

discourse would not resolve the subjectivity problem; its outlines would be controversial and would require counter-majoritarian balancing by the Court.
Further discussion of this possibility is beyond the scope of this Book Review. My
suggestion here is simply that, although Gedicks’s stated purpose is to describe rather
than solve the problem, his insightful theoretical analysis seems to readily give way to
fatalistic resignation.
51. Because “religious communitarian discourse,” as Gedicks has defined it, implies elements of the de facto Protestant establishment that Gedicks finds objectionable
from the perspective of minority religious groups, I refer here to a more general religiously informed discourse.
52. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
53. That would be bad for the law professor business. However, in his most recent article on the subject, this seems to be what Professor Gedicks recommends, at
least in the context of religious exemptions from generally applicable laws:
To justify granting an exemption from religiously neutral laws to adversely
affected religious believers, one needs a theory that explains why religion is a
uniquely valuable human activity entitled to uniquely strong constitutional
protection. Such a theory, however, would fly directly in the face of the normative presuppositions of secular individualism. . . . Theories of special protection of religion will almost certainly remain voices crying in the wilderness, like parents lamenting that their children do not act like adults. And
like parents, religion clause theorists might do better to deal with what is,
rather than searching for what is unlikely ever to be found.
Gedicks, supra note 6, at 1258.
54. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 9.
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that defines it.55 By recognizing the impossibility of “inherent
meaning,” secular individualism also makes impossible any absolute faith in its own account of the “facts,” even within the
discourse itself. In postmodern terms, the secular individualist
discourse fails to provide itself a “center” upon which meaning
within the system can be grounded.56
Religion-based discourse, in contrast, does not acknowledge
the postmodern idea that truth is relative. Its disagreement
with secular individualism is not that secularism is subjective,
but that it is absolutely wrong.57 For the religion-based discourse, the “center” which provides absolute meaning within
the system is God himself. Although access to this center may
be problematic at times, belief in its existence allows for absolute faith in the truth of “facts” dependent upon such belief. For
those who believe in God, the account given by religion-based
discourse of the facts surrounding the church-state debate can
be intellectually satisfying because, from their perspective, the
absolute meaning of those facts is not impossible to conceive.
According to strict postmodern theory,58 even the “center” is
part of the system it defines.59 The meaning provided by any
center, although absolute to those operating within the system,
will still be subjective to those viewing the facts from a different theoretical perspective. Thus, from a postmodern point of
view, the fact that religion-based discourse is centered on the
absolute wisdom of God does not allow it to escape the subjectivity problem. However, unlike the secular individualist discourse, the religion-based discourse’s center allows it to be internally consistent. And unlike secular individualism, which is
forced by its own relativism to feign objectivity in order to create any meaning, religion-based discourse is theoretically honest. Even if God is dead, secular individualism, by its own admission, cannot be intrinsically “correct.” At least for religionbased discourse, the possibility of correctness exists.
55. See supra Part II.
56. See Cowles, supra note 22, at 106-07. Derrida refers to this concept of the
“center” as the “transcendental signified.” Id. at 106.
57. Cf. GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 26 (“Most of those inhabiting the world of one
church-state discourse . . . understand quite well the world of the other; they simply
think the other is wrong.”).
58. “Strict postmodern theory” may be an oxymoron.
59. See Cowles, supra note 22, at 106 (noting that the impression of inherent
meaning provided by a center is “an illusion” because “every center actually depends on
the very system it supposedly grounds”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Like Professor Gedicks, my purpose here has not been to
propose a practical “solution” to the inconsistency that has occurred in religion clause jurisprudence. Rather, it has been to
analyze Professor Gedicks’s theoretical approach and, in keeping with this focus, to explore the theoretical strengths and
weaknesses of the competing discourses he identifies. I, like
Professor Gedicks, have concluded that the secular individualist discourse fails to do what it promises: provide an objective,
neutral answer to church-state issues. Unlike Professor Gedicks, I conclude that a broadly defined religion-based discourse is more theoretically satisfying. Although it is unclear
what practical implications this theoretical discussion of the
competing discourses may have, as Professor Gedicks notes, it
is sometimes enough to simply demonstrate a problem in hopes
that a solution will presently appear.60
D. Heath Bailey

60. See GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 125.

